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INTRODUCTION
n recent years, the federal government has dramatically increasedIthe prosecution of environmental crimes.' The government has
concluded that civil sanctions alone do not deter illegal conduct.2
* B.A., 1977, State University of New York at Stony Brook; J.D., 1980, Fordiam
University; Adjunct Professor, Syracuse University College of Law. The author rep-
resented the appellant before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in United'States v.
Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994). This Article is intended to present a balanced discussion of the
relevant issues and law. The author gratefully acknowledges the input of Craig A.
Benedict, Assistant United States Attorney for the Northern District of New York,
who represented the United States in Laughlin. The views expressed in this Article
are solely those of the author.
1. See Dick Thornburgh, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws-A Na-
tional Priority, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 775, 776 (1991), in which the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States declared that the policy of the federal government is to
promote criminal prosecutions under environmental statutes. "Criminal enforcement
of environmental laws is not merely a goal, it is a priority-one that has been devel-
oping progressively over the past two decades." Id. See also Robert W. Adler &
Charles Lord, Environmental Crimes: Raising the Stakes, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 781,
790-91 (1991) (statistical analysis showing sharp increase in investigations and indict-
ments by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and Department of Justice
("DOJ"); Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Envi-
ronmental Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
900, 901 (1991) ("[T]he federal government in recent years has dedicated increasing
law enforcement resources to the investigation and prosecution of environmental
crimes.") See also Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, §§ 201-205,
104 Stat. 2962 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (Supp. V 1993)) (requiring, inter
alia, the EPA to substantially increase investigative resources to more than 200 crimi-
nal investigators). See generally Robert A. Milne, The Mens Rea Requirements of the
Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Criminal Liability in Substance But Not Form,
37 BuiF. L. REV. 307, 308-309 (1988-89) (advocating increased criminal enforcement
of environmental statutes to deter violation of federal environmental statutes); James
S. Lynch, The Criminal Provisions of RCRA: Should Strict Liability Be Applied To Its
Permit Requirement?, 5 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 127, 128 (1989) (reviewing
elements of RCRA in context of increasing federal prosecutions).
2. Thornburgh, supra note 1, at 775. Waste generating entities treated civil sanc-
tions as a cost of doing business, and passed the cost along to the consumer: "[Oiften
it was cheaper to dump industrial wastes illegally, and pay the fines for breaking envi-
ronmental laws, than to spend money on properly processing wastes.... The cost of
violating environmental laws seemed to be a small enough price to pay compared to
the cost of compliance.": Id. However, incarceration is a cost that cannot be passed
along to the consumer. "[T]he threat of incarceration undoubtedly deters other cor-
porate ?fficials from engaging in or countenancing similar misconduct and causes
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Moreover, the government has come to recognize that environmental
crimes pose one of the most serious risks of harm to the 'public at
large.3
Two of the most frequently prosecuted environmental crimes are set
forth in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"),4
and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act ("CERCLA").5 , Section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA
makes it a crime to "knowingly treat[], store[], or dispose[] of any
hazardous waste identified or listed" as such under RCRA "without a
them to become more compliance-conscious." Starr, supra note 1, at 901; Milne, supra
note 1, at 308 n.8 ("Civil remedies proved ineffective as a deterrent to corporate
polluters.").
3. See Christopher Harris et al., Criminal Liability for Violations of Federal Haz-
ardous Waste Law: The "Knowledge" of Corporations and Their Executives, 23 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 203, 205-206 (1988) (quoting HOUSE SUBCOMMITrEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF 'THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COM-
MERCE, REPORT ON HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., at 31
(Comm. Print 1979), in which James Moorman, Assistant United States Attorney in
charge of Land & Natural Resources, testified before Congress that government did
not know the "dimensions" of the problem of hazardous waste'.
Moorman's testimony reflected the fact that during the late [1970s] several
highly publicized incidents galvanized public opinion into a conviction that
the threat to public health was both real and immediate. In the public's
mind, places such as the Chemical Control site in Elizabeth, New Jersey,
Love Canal in Niagara Falls, New York, the so-called Valley of the Drums in
Shepardsville, Kentucky, and the Stringfellow Acid Pits in California had
become synonymous with-and the symbols of-corporate America's reck-
less disregard of public health.
Id. at 206.
Several highly publicized environmental disasters confirmed the scope and gravity.
of environmental crimes in the United States. See generally Adler & Lord, supra note
1, at 782-85; 1990 State/Federal Natural Resource Damage Assessment Plan for the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill (Aug. 1990) (prepared through the cooperation of the State of
Alaska, the United States Departments of Agriculture and Interior, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the EPA). See, e.g., United States v.
Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 549 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (more than
21,000 tons of waste were deposited in New York's Love Canal area); New York v.
General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 291, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 1984) (General Electric disposed
of several hundred 55-gallon drums containing hazardous substances near Glens Falls,
New York, resulting in extensive environmental damage). See also F. Henry Habicht,
II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to Remain
on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10478, 10485 n.64 (1987) (Justice
Department poll revealed that Americans view environmental crime resulting in
death as the seventh most severe crime, ahead of skyjacking and drug smuggling);
Daniel Riesel, Criminal Prosecution and Defense of Environmental Wrongs, 15 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10065, 10072 (1985) (suggesting criminal sanctions are espe-
cially necessary for corporate crimes becauseimprisonment and social stigma serve as
deterrents to corporate officers).
4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1988)).
5. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 ("CERCLA"), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by the
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, .Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100
Stat.'1613 (1986) (codified in certain sections of the Internal Revenue Code and Titles
10, 29, 33, and 42 of the United States Code).
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permit."6 Likewise, section 9603(b) of CERCLA makes it a crime for
any person "in charge of a facility from which a hazardous substance
is released" to fail "to notify immediately the appropriate agency of
the United States Government as soon as he 'has knowledge of such
release," if the release exceeds a specified quantity.7 The illegal dispo-
sal of a hazardous waste often constitutes a violation of both RCRA
and CERCLA, warranting a simultaneous prosecution for such
offenses.8
Since their enactment, courts have struggled to define the mens rea
required for these crimes.9 Although section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA
contains the term "knowingly," and section 9603(b) of CERCLA con-
tains the term "knowledge," each statute is unclear as to which ele-
ments such terms modify.' 0 When interpreting these statutes, courts
have been influenced by two conflicting legal precepts: (1) as a gen-
eral rule, conduct is not criminal, unless committed knowingly," and
(2) statutes designed to protect the public welfare may criminalize in-
-6. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1988 &'Supp. V 1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) (disposal of hazardous waste under RCRA) and 42
U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (release of hazardous substance under CER-,
CLA). The term "hazardous substance" as used in 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b), includes,
among other things, any hazardous waste having the characteristics identified under
or listed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (except for any waste controlled by regulations
that have been suspended by act of Congress). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(C). The term
"release" as used in CERCLA means, among other things, "disposing." 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(22). The term "disposal" under CERCLA has the same meaning under
RCRA. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(29). Therefore, a "disposal" of "hazardous waste" under
§ 6928(d)(2) of RCRA will also constitute a "release" of a "hazardous substance"
under § 9603(b) of CERCLA. The release must also exceed the reportable quantity
designated by'CERCLA. See generally United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir.
1993).
9. See infra parts II and I1. See generally United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
403 (1980) ("Few areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition
of the mens rea required for any particular crime.").
10. See infra part II.
11. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978) ("in-
tent generally remains an indispensable element of a criminal offense"); Morissette v.
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 254 n.14 (1952) (criminal law must require mens rea to be
accepted as constitutional); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951) ("[t]he
existence of a mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of
'Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence"). See generally WAYNE LAFAVE & AUSIN
Scor, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.4, at 212 (1986) [hereinafter LAFAVE & Scorr I]. "Mens
rea" is defined as a guilty mind or'a wrongful purpose. Id. The Model Penal Code
has established four groups of crimes based on mental culpability. These groups in-
clude crimes requiring purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence. MObEL PE-
NAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1962). This basic tenant of criminal law is sometimes referred to
by the Latin maxim "actus not facit reum nisi mens sit rea" (an act does not make a
person guilty unless his mind is guilty). Id. This principle can be traced to Roman
law. Keith A. Onsdorff & James M. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer
Doctrine In RCRA Criminal Enforcement What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 22
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10099 (1992). The concept was then carried forward
into eighteenth-century English common law, and thereupon became firmly rooted in
the Anglo-American criminal justice system. I&
19951
160 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
nocent conduct.12 Courts have reached varying conclusions based
upon the extent to which one precept is weighed more heavily than
the other.13
In United States v. Laughlin,4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
recently joined the fray by addressing, the issue of mens rea under
section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA and section 9603(b) of CERCLA.15 Sid-
ing with the majority view,16 the court held that several elements of
such crimes do not require that a defendant possess knowledge of the
violated regulations.' 7 However, the court also indicated that RCRA
requires that the defendant know that the waste being treated, stored,
or disposed of poses "a substantial present or potential hazard" to
human health or the environment as defined by RCRA. 18 Such inter-
pretation may provide criminal defendants with an important basis to
defend prosecutions under RCRA. 9
[T]he contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by
intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a conse-
quent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and
evil. A relation between some mental element and punishment for a harm-
ful act is almost as instinctive as the child's familiar exculpatory "But I didn't
mean to," and has afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished sub-
stitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance
as the motivation for public prosecution. Unqualified acceptance of this'
doctrine by English common law in the Eighteenth Century was indicated by
Blackstone's sweeping statement that to constitute any crime there must first
be a "vicious will."
Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250-51 (footnotes omitted).
12. See LAFAVE & Scor I, supra note 11, § 2.12(d), at 155-56 (discussing consti-
tutionality of strict liability statutes).
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution forbid the federal
government and the states from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. Offenses requiring no mens
rea must bear a substantial relationship to a matter of legitimate public concern so as
not to offend due process. See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959) ("public
interest in the purity of its food is so great as to warrant the imposition of the highest
standard of care on distributors-in fact an absolute standard .... "); United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) (federal narcotics statute required no mens rea because of
the seriousness of offense); United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir.) (court upheld
lack of scienter requirement in statute prohibiting boarding or attempting to board
aircraft with weapon), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975). Cf. Nigor v. United States, 4
F.2d 781 (8th Cir. 1925) (court found scienter necessary in statute imposing strict lia-
bility on those buying drugs with forged stamps). But see Liparota v. United States,
471 U.S. 419 (1985) (strict liability provision struck down in public welfare statute).
13. See infra parts II and III.
14. 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994) (defendants Kenneth Laughlin and John Donnelly pled guilty
prior to trial, and did not appeal; defendant Harris Goldman was found guilty at trial,
and his conviction was affirmed on appeal).
15. Id. at 964-67.
16. Id. at 965-66.
17. Id. at 966-67.
18. Id. at 967 (emphasis in original).
19. See infra part IV.
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This Article analyzes the extent to which section 6928(d)(2) of
RCRA and section 9603(b) of CERCLA contain mens rea elements,
particularly in light of the Second Circuit's recent decision in United
States v. Laughlin. Part I of this Article reviews the historical basis
and underlying rationales for the mens rea and public welfare princi-
ples. Part Ii of this Article examines the statutory language, legisla-
tive history, underlying objectives, and prior judicial construction of
the foregoing sections of RCRA and CERCLA. Part III of this Arti-
cle examines the arguments made to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Laughlin and the decision rendered by the
court. Finally, Part IV discusses the ramifications of the Second Cir-
cuit's decision in Laughlin on future prosecutions under RCRA and
CERCLA.
I. THE CONFLICT BETWEE, THE PRINCIPLES OF MENS REA AND
THE PUBLIC WELFARE
The principle that an injury is not a crime unless committed by in-
tention is "as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as be-
lief in freedom of the human will and a consequent ability and duty
(of the normal individual) to choose between good and evil."2 Some
commentators trace this principle to early primitive law, in which the
acts of children and the insane were excused.21 The ancient Greeks
advanced the notion that human beings are endowed with free will,
20. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952).
21. Gerhard 0. W. Mueller, Tort, Crime, and the Primitive, 46 J. CRIM. LAW,
CRIMINOLOGY & POL. Sci. 303 (1955-56); RUDOLPH GERBER, THE INSANITY DE-
FENSE 7-8 (1984).
The ancient Hebrew tribes recognized the difference between intentional and acci-
dental conduct, with children and the insane incapable of committing crimes. "A
deaf-mute, an idiot, and a minor are awkward to deal with, as he who injures them is
liable [to pay], whereas if they injure others they are exempt." GERBER, supra,,at 8,
94 n.3 (citing THE BABYLONIA TALMUD, BABA KAMMA 501-502 (Epstein ed., 1935)
and THE CODE OF MAIMON, THE BOOK OF TORTS, Bool Eleven (Oberman ed.,
1954)):
To clash with a deaf mute, an imbecile, or a minor is bad, seeing that if one
wounds one of these, he is liable, whereas if they wound others, they are
exempt. Even if a deaf-mute becomes normal, or an imbecile becomes sane,
.or a minor reaches majority, they are not liable for payment inasmuch as
they were legally irresponsible when they caused the wound.
Holmes agreed that primitive man recognized the difference between intentional
and unintentional conduct, stating that "even a dog distinguishes between being stum-
bled over and being kicked." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (42d
ed. 1948). Likewise, Percy Winfield argued, "No sane human being, ancient or mod-
em, needs any mental education beyond that of general experience to say, '[He or
she] did not mean to do this,' and therefore to inflict a lighter penalty or possibly none
at all. Mediaeval [sic] man is at least that much removed from a beast." Percy H.
Winfield, The Myth of Absolute Liability, 42 LAW Q. REV. 37 (1926).
On the other hand, John Wigmore argued that primitive law was governed by strict
liability. "The doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted innocently or inadver-
tently, because he was the doer." John H. Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts:
Its History, 7 HARV. L. REV. 315, 317 (1894).
19951
162 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
and are therefore responsible for injuries caused by the "deliberate
desire of things in [their] own power."2 The Romans codified the
rule that "an act does not make one guilty unless his mind is guilty.123
In the Middle Ages, the clergy were the judges in the royal courts of
England, melding Roman law and Canon law, and declaring that an
actor's intent gives moral significance to the act, thereby determining
culpability.24 Eighteenth-century English common law required the
Likewise, H. Brunner believed that under primitive Germanic law, an early prede-
cessor of the common law, there was no difference between intentional and uninten-
tional conduct: "The early law knows no such thing as accident, but seeks always for
something to makeanswerable, and determines it, by a scarcely appreciable causation
nexus, from the conditions of the harmful result." Wigmore, supra, at 319 (translating
2 H. BRUNNER, DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHE 549 (1906)).
22. GERBER, supra note 21, at 8, 94 n.6, (quoting ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 58 (Ross, trans., 1954)).
Aristotle distinguished between voluntary and involuntary acts, with a voluntary act
free from ignorance or compulsion. Id. One is morally responsible for an act when,
knowing the relevant circumstances, he deliberately commits the act. Id. On the
other hand, Plato refused to distinguish bet~veen voluntary and involuntary acts.
However, Plato conceded that intentional injuries warranted greater sanctions than
acts of passion. Id. at 8 (citing PLATO, LAWS, Book IX, at 256 (Taylor, trans., 1931)).
Plato also believed that human beings possessed "an element of free choice" that
made them responsible for criminal acts. Id. (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 350
(Cornford, trans., 1915)). See also Agretelis, Mens Rea in Plato and Aristotle, ISSUES
IN CRIMINOLOGY 19 (1969); GERBER, supra note 21, at 8.
23. Known by the Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea." In' addi-
tion, Justinian's legal code in the sixth century exempted children and the insane as a
privileged legal class. GERBER, supra note 21, at 8,.94 n.7 (citing JUSTINIAN, DIGEST.
48.4.2.).
24. In 1264, Henry de Bracton was named Archdeacon of Barnstape and Chancel-
lor of Exeter Cathedral. GERBER, supra note 21, at 9. In 1265, Bracton became the
Chief Judge of the Aulia Regis, England's highest court. Id. Bracton wrote DE
LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (1300), borrowing heavily from early Ro-
man law and reflecting strong ecclesiastical influence. GERBER, supra note 21, at 9.
Bracton later wrote, "For a crime is not committed unless the will to harm be present.
Misdeeds are distinguished by both will and by intention.... In misdeeds we look to
the will and not the outcome." Id. Likewise, Bracton distinguished intentional from
accidental homicides. 2 BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 340-
42 (G. Woodbine ed. & S. Thorne trans. 1968). See Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History
of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 829-30 (1980).
This same principle was earlier recognized in the LAWS OF ALFRED (871-899),
which stated:
Let the man who slayeth another wil[l]fully perish by death. Let him who
slayeth another... unwillingly or unwil[l]fully, as God may have sent him
unto his hands, and for who[m] he has not lain in wait, be worthy of his life,
and of lawful 'bo[u]t,' if he seek asylum. If, however, any one presump-
tuously and wil[l]fully slay his neighbo[u]r through guile, pluck thou him
from my altar, to the end that he may perish by death.
1 ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND 47-49 (B. Thorpe ed., 1840) (quoting
LAWS OF ALFRED § 13). See also LEGES HENRICI PRIMI (L. J. Downer ed., 1972) ("A
person is not to be considered guilty unless he has a guilty intention."). Historians,
however, believe that the foregoing phrase was not the law of England at the time of
King Henry I (1068-1135, son of William the Conqueror), but instead "an exotic
transplant from St. Augustine." Winfield, supra note 21, at 41. At the very least, the
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existence of a "vicious will" for conduct to be criminal25 With Eng-
lish common law as its bedrock, the United States recognized the
mens rea requirement as a time-honored principle of criminal juris-
prudence.26 The principle is so strong in American law that the
Supreme Court once declared that if Congress wished to depart from
that norm, it may do so, but in general must manifest its intention by
affirmative instruction.27
The requirement of mens rea focuses on the moral blameworthiness
of an individual.28 It justifies severe punishment for knowingly wrong-
ful conduct. 29 Additionally, mens rea affords "the rational basis for a
.. substitution of deterrence and reformation in place of retaliation
and vengeance as a motivation for public prosecution."3
In contrast, the principle that the State may criminalize innocent
conduct to protect the public welfare is based upon the utilitarian con-
cept that the good of the many may outweigh the rights of the few.31
The focus is not on the moral blameworthiness of the individual, but
rather on the needs of society, and the greater good that may be de-
rived from criminalizing conduct creating a substantial risk to the pub-
lic at large.32 It has been called a method of social control and crime
reduction.3 3 Strict criminal liability is claimed by some to deter profit-
driven manufacturers from exposing the public to hazardous sub-
stances released in the course of the manufacturing process.34
The move toward strict criminal liability first occurred in England in
the mid-nineteenth century, -3 5 most likely in response to the evils of
the Industrial Revolution, when adulterated or diseased foods
wreaked havoc on the populace.36 Despite the presence of such social
problems, England embraced the concept only tentatively,37 and the
role of strict liability in England has diminished in the twentieth
century.38
The United States, by contrast, readily accepted the principle of
strict criminal liability in the latter part of the nineteenth century, ap-
LEGESHENRICI PRIMI suggests that such principle was recognized, and perhaps par-
tially implemented, by the Anglo-Saxon period of Henry I. Robinson, supra, at 828.
25. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-51 (1952); Onsdorff & Mesnard,
supra note 11.
26. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250, 261-63.
27. Id.
28. See Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: Ill-The Rise And Fall of
Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. REV. 337 (1989).
29. Id. at 404-408.
30. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 251.
31. See Singer, supra note 28, at 337-38.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 337.
34. Id. at 389.
35. Id. at 340-63.
36. Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1933).
37. See Singer, supra note 28, at 359-60.
38. Id. at 377-79.
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plying it, in large part, to the regulation of liquor and for the protec-
tion of children. 39  Congress also moved to protect a quasi-
environmental concern when it enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act
of 1899,40 which imposed strict criminal liability for the discharge of
any "refuse matter" into the navigable waters of the United States.41
In the twentieth century, the United States enacted several statutes
designed to protect the public health, safety, and Welfare by criminal-
izing a broad range of conduct that created serious risks of harm.42
When upholding public welfare statutes, the Supreme Court de-
clared that they were enacted "[i]n the interest of the larger good"
and put "the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise inno-
cent but standing in a responsible relation to a public danger. ' 43. The
Supreme Court stated that a reasonable person should know that cer-
tain substances are subject to stringent public regulation and may seri-
ously threaten the community's health or safety.' As a consequence,
Congress could constitutionally criminalize conduct that threatened
the public welfare, even if committed unintentionally, if the statute
touched "phases of the lives and health of people which, in the
circumstances of modern industrialism, are largely beyond self-
protection. '41
The conflict between the requirement of mens rea and the need to
protect the public welfare occurs most strikingly in statiftes, such as
39. Id. at 363.
40. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
41. Section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 states, in pertinent part:
[I]t shall not be lawful to throw, discharge, or deposit, or cause, suffer, or
procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any
ship, barge, or other floating craft of any kind, or from the shore, wharf,
manufacturing establishment or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any
kind or description whatever . . .. into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same
shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and it shall not be lawful
to deposit, or cause, suffer, or procure to be deposited material of any kind
in any place on the bank of any navigable water.., whereby navigation shall
or may be impeded or obstructed ....
33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
42. See Morissette v. United States, 342.U.S. 246, 253-56 (1952). Public welfare
statutes are a congressional response to the Industrial Revolution:
Wide distribution of goods became an instrument of wide distribution of
harm when those who dispersed food, drink, drugs, and even securities, did
not comply with reasonable standards of quality, integrity, disclosure, and
care. Such dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed
regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular indus-
tries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety, and
welfare.
Id. at 254.
43. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (citing United States
v.Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922)).
44. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 671 (1975).
45. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 280-81.
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RCRA and CERCLA, that embody both principles.' As discussed
below, both RCRA and CERCLA contain mens rea components, and
were designed to protect the public welfare.47 The battleground be-
tween these principles occurs in the interpretation of ambiguous ele-
ments of these crimes in which the reach of the mens rea component is
uncertain from the language of the statute." Given such ambiguities,
courts have reached varying interpretations, depending upon which" 49
principle is weighed more heavily than the other..
II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS OF THE MENS REA ELEMENTS OF
RCRA AND CERCLA
The purpose of statutory analysis is to determine the intent of Con-
gress.50 Such intent may be revealed from: (1) the statutory language,5'
46. See United States v. Jones, 735 F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir.) (interpreting the
"knowing" requirement of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1969 to mean
that "the prosecution must prove generally only that the defendant knowingly com-
mitted the offensive act, not that the defendant knowingly violated the law"), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 918 (1984). See also United States v. Udofot, 711 F.2d 831, 837 (8th
Cir.) (holding that "knowing," as used in the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C.
,§ 922(e) (1988), does not require the government to prove that the defendant knew
that he was violating the law but only that he knew he was delivering firearms or
ammunition), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 896 (1983); United States v. International Mineral
& Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971), discussed infra at note 77 and accompanying
text. But see Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985) (holding that government
has burden of showing that defendant knew his possession of food stamps was unau-
thorized by statute or regulation).
47. See infra parts II and III.
48. Id.
* 49. Id.
50. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406 (1980).
[I]n performing such analysis courts obviously must follow Congress' intent
as to the required level of mental culpability for any particular offense.
Principals derived from common law as well as precepts suggested by the
American Law Institute must bow to legislative mandates. . . . The
administration of the federal system of criminal justice is confided to
ordinary mortals, whether they be lawyers, judges, or jurors. This system
could easily fall of its own weight if courts or scholars become obsessed with
hair-splitting distinctions, either traditional or novel, that Congress neither
stated nor implied when it made the conduct criminal.
Id. at 406-407.
51. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (ascertaining the
meaning of a statute requires one to first examine the statutory language); Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (statutory,
interpretation begins with statute's language); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S.
470, 485 (1917) ("Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid
doubtful meanings need no discussion.") (citation omitted).
See also REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
232-33 (1975); 2A CHARLES DALLAS SANDS, -SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (5th ed. 1992); WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS
AND DRAFTING 76 (2d ed. 1984). Statutory language must be examined in light of the
purpose that the legislature had in passing the statute, its legislative history, and the
relationship of the statute to other statutes. Id. One must go "outside" the four
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'(2) the legislative history,52 and (3) the underlying objectives of the
statute. 3 Such statutory analysis will be undertaken below.
A. Analysis of Section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA
RCRA section 6928(d) states:
Any person who- ...
(2) knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste-
identified or listed under this subchapter-
(A) without a permit.. .; or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement
of such permit; or
(C) in knowing- violation of any material condition or requirement
of any applicable interim status regulations or standards ... shall,
54upon conviction, be subject to a fine... or imprisonment....
1. The Language of Section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA
Although section 6928(d)(2) expressly contains a mens rea compo-
nent,55 the statute is unclear as to which phrase or phrases the term
corners of the statute when its meaning is unclear. Id. Felix Frankfurter, Some
Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 535-38 (1947)
(discussing ambiguity of words and necessity to look beyond them).
52. See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 406. See, e.g., Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458
U.S. 564, 574 (1982) (a statute's legislative history "confirms that Congress intended
the statute to mean exactly what its plain language says"); United States v, Clark, 454
U.S. 555, 561 (1982) ("Although the language of the statute is clear, any lingering
doubt as to its proper construction may be resolved by examining the legislative his-
tory of the statute. .. ").
53. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964) ("[I]t is the duty of the
courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the
congressional purpose."). STATSKY, supra note 50, at 76.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).
55. A person acts "knowingly" when the person is aware that "the result is practi-
cally certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may be as to that result."
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-45 (1978). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(b)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) [hereinafter
MODEL PENAL CODE DRAFT] (a person acts ."knowingly" if "he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result."). Federal courts have
long struggled in defining the level of culpability necessary for a particular crime. See
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, 1 WORKING PA-
PERS OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 123
(1970) [hereinafter WORKING PAPERS]; Bailey, 444 U.S. at 394. Courts described cer-
tain crimes as requiring either "general intent" or "specific intent." Id. at 404-405.
Such distinction led to confusion and inconsistent applications of the terms. WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 201-202
(1972) [hereinafter LAFAVE & ScoT-r II]. In 1970, the National Commission on Re-
form of Federal Criminal Laws called for "a new departure" and a "general rethink-
ing of traditional mens rea analysis." WORKING PAPERS, supra, at 123. Eventually,
workable principles for determining criminal culpability were codified. Id. See, e.g.,
MODEL PENAL CODE DRAFT, supra, §§ 2.01-2.02. The American Law Institute codi-
fied the MODEL PENAL CODE, which replaced the ambiguous dichotomy between
"specific intent" and "general intent" with a hierarchy of culpable states of mind.
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"knowingly" modifies.5 6 For example, does the term "knowingly"
merely modify the phrase "treats, stores, or disposes," or does it also
modify the terms "hazardous waste," "identified or listed," or "with-
out a permit." Statutes similarly drafted have been held to be linguis-
tically ambiguous.57 In similar contexts, courts have had difficulty in
determining how far into a sentence the term "knowingly" travels.58
A variety of rules of construction are available to courts to use in
resolving this ambiguity 9 However, courts have also warned against
relying too heavily upon. punctuation and grammatical structure to
discern congressional intent.6°
Armed with such warning, several linguistic arguments can be made
regarding the statutory interpretation of RCRA's section 6928(d)(2).
The most restrictive interpretation is that the term "knowingly" only
modifies the phrase "treats, stores, or disposes," because the term im-
mediately precedes this phrase,61 and is, to some extent, set off by
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403-404. The MODEL PENAL CODE identified four levels of culpa-
bility, in descending order of gravity: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negli-
gence. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404. See LAFAVE &' ScoTr II, supra, at 194; MODEL PENAL
CODE DRAFT, supra § 2.02. In general, the term "purpose" roughly corresponds to
the common-law concept of "specific intent," and the term "knowledge" roughly cor-
responds with the term "general intent." See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comments
at 125. (Tentative Draft No. 4, 1955); LAFAVE & SCOTr II, supra at 201-202.
56. See infra notes 57-118 and accompanying text.
57. United.States v. Speach, 968 F.2d 795, 796 (9th Cir. 1992). See Liparota v.
United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424-28 (1985) (construing federal statute governing food
stamp fraud, which provides that whoever knowingly uses, transfers, acquires, alters,
or possesses coupons or authorization cards in any manner not authorized by the
statute or the regulations "shall be guilty of a criminal offense").
58. Speach, 968 F.2d at 796; Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425 n.7.- The Supreme Court
observed in Liparota that "Congress certainly intended by use of the word 'know-
ingly' to require some mental state with respect to some element of the crime....
[B]eyond this, the words themselves provide little guidance." Id. at 424 (emphasis
added). The Court resolved the dilemma by holding that proof of a knowing violation
requires "a showing that the defendant knew his conduct to be unauthorized by stat-
ute or regulations." Id. at 425. It was not necessary to prove that the defendant knew
of the specific statute or regulation that was violated. The government must prove
that the defendant knew that the conduct was unauthorized or illegal. Id. at 433-34.
59, LAFAVE & Scorr II, supra note 54, § 2.2(a), at 104-105. Some dispute
whether courts first decide how an ambiguous statute ought to be interpreted, and
then apply whatever rules of statutory construction will support the desired interpre-
tation. Id. at 105. Others believe that courts first employ the rules of construction,
and then reach the result that such rules mandate. Id. "Doubtless the truth lies some-
where in between-some judges are apt to do it one way, some the other; some cases
lend themselves to one technique, some to the other." Id.
60. United States v. Laughlin, .768 F.- Supp. 957, 960 (N.D.N.Y. 1991)
("[L]egislative drafters do not always operate with a high degree of linguistic preci-
sion."), aff'd, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994). See, e.g., United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 507 (2d
Cir.) ("[P]unctuation- is not necessarily decisive in construing statutes.") (citations
omitted), cert. denied; 112 S. Ct. 72 (1991).
61. Such literal construction was rejected by the courts in United States v. Dee,
912 F.2d 741, 745-46 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991); United States v.
Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United
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commas. Punctuation, such as a comma, has been relied on to signal
that a term is independent of the language that follows.62 On the
other hand, courts have also held that the mere placement of a comma
does not render text clear and unambiguous.63 In United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc.,64 the Third Circuit held that an interpretation
that. limits application of the term "knowingly" exclusively to the
phrase "treats, stores, or disposes" is "overly literal."65
A more reasonable interpretation of section 6928(d)(2) is that the
term "knowingly" not only modifies the phrase "treats, stores, or dis-
poses," but also modifies the term "hazardous waste." The term "haz-
ardous waste" is the object of the sentence, and stands in direct
linguistic relation to the adverb "knowingly. '66 Courts considering
this question have held that a defendant must be aware that the waste
was hazardous.67 However, the extent of such knowledge remains un-
certain. Some circuit courts have held that a defendant need only
know that the waste has "a general hazardous character. ' 68 Other cir-
cuit courts have upheld instructions that the defendant need only
States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985). In Laughlin, the government recognized that knowledge that the
waste was hazardous was part of its proof. Laughlin, 768 F. Supp. at 962 n.5. On
appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this proposition. Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 966.
62. See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (interpret-
ing the Bankruptcy Code).
63. See Morris, 928 F.2d at 507 (government argued that the placement of a
comma after the term "authorization" in the computer crime statute limited the ex-
tent to which the term "intentionally" modified any succeeding language). But see
United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984). No rule of grammar requires that this
term be applied to every subsequent phrase in the section. Id. at 69 n.6.
64. Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d 662.
65. Id. at 667-68. See supra note 12 (discussion of strict liability).
66. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1039 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1083 (1990) ("Subsection (2) applies to anyone who 'knowingly treats, stores
or disposes of any hazardous waste .... ' The term 'knowingly' modifies 'hazardous
waste' as well as 'treats, stores or disposes of,' and thus, one who does not know the
waste he is disposing of is hazardous cannot violate Section 6928(d)(2)(A).").
67. United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 966 (2d Cir. 1993) ("With respect to the
mens rea required by Section 6928(d)(2)(A), the Government need prove only that a
defendant Was aware of his'act of disposing of a substance he knew was hazardous
.. "), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994); United
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991) ("[I]t
was error to instruct the jury that defendants had to know the substances involved
were chemicals, without indicating that they also had to, know the chemicals were
hazardous.. ."); Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039; United States v. Heuer, 4 F.3d 723, 731 (9th
Cir. 1993) ("[T]he term 'knowingly' modifies both words in the unpunctuated phrase
'hazardous waste'."), cert. denied, 114 S.-Ct. 1190 (i994); United States v. Goldsmith,
978 F.2d 643, 646 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc., 934 F.2d
599, 613 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991); Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033; United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d
1447, 1452 (11th Cir. 1988).
68. See Goldsmith, 978 F.2d at 645 ("The government need only prove that a de-
fendant had knowledge of 'the general hazardous character' of the chemical."); Dee,
912 F.2d at 745 ("[T]he knowledge element of Section 6928(d) does extend to knowl-
edge of the general hazardous character of the wastes.").
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know "that the waste had the potential to be harmful to others or to
the environment, or, in other words, it was not an innocuous 'sub-
stance like water."'69 However, no circuit court prior to the Second
Circuit in Laughlin addressed whether a trial court should instruct in
accordance with the statutory definition of "hazardous waste" under
RCRA.7 °
A more troublesome question is whether the term "knowingly" also
modifies the term hazardous waste "listed or identified under this sub-
chapter." Stated differently, must a defendant know that the govern-
ment has "listed or identified" the waste as hazardous? A strong
linguistic argument can be made that such a phrase is modified by the
term "knowingly." In related contexts, courts have held that a mens
rea term modifies the entire adjacent phrase in which such a term is
contained. 71 Moreover, this construction is consistent with the funda-
mental principle that "a statute should not be interpreted so as to
render the legislature's language mere surplusage. ' '72 Congress did
not merely identify the substance as a "hazardous waste," but as a
"hazardous waste listed or identified under this subchapter." 73 De-
fendants have argued that a court must instruct that a person know
that the waste was "listed or identified" by the EPA as hazardous,
because the failure to do so will allow the felony conviction of an "in-
nocent" person.74 Despite such seemingly strong arguments, almost
every circuit court considering this issue has rejected application of
the term "knowingly" to the phrase "listed or identified. '75 Courts
69. See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1039 ("While these instructions did not use the word
'hazardous,' ... that did require the jury to find that Hoffin disposed of chemical
waste which he knew 'had the potential to be harmful to others or to the environ-
ment.' This instruction was sufficient."); Greer, 850 F.2d 1447.
70. See infra part I1. In Baytank, the Fifth Circuit refused to address this question
because it had not been presented for review. Baytank, 934 F.2d at 610-11.
71. See, United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 72
(1991) (interpreting mens rea element of statute making intentional access to a com-
puter without authorization a crime).
72. In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp., 850 F.2d 1275, 1280 (8th Cir. 1988). See also In
re Kun, 868 F.2d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'd on reh'g, 931 F.2d 897 (1991); 2A
NORMAN SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY C6NSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed. 1984).
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
74. See Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612.
75. United States v. Goldsmith, 978 F.2d 643, 645 (11th Cir. 1992) ("It is not nec-
essary that the government prove that the defendant knew a chemical waste had been
defined as a 'hazardous waste' by the Environmental Protection Agency . . .");
Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612 ("We conclude that in the circumstances of this case the
court was not required to instruct that the jury must find that the defendant knew the
waste had been identified by the EPA regulations as hazardous under the RCRA.");
United States v. Sellers, 926 F.2d 410,415 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Although the Government
must prove that the waste disposed of was listed or identified or characterized by the
E.P.A. as a hazardous waste" the Government is not required to prove that the de-
fendant knew that the waste was a hazardous waste within the meaning of the regula-
tions."); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d at 745 ("[Tlhe government did not need to
prove defendants knew violation of RCRA was a crime, nor that regulations existed
listing and identifying the chemical wastes as RCRA hazardous wastes."); see gener-
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have applied the familiar principle that "ignorance of the law is no
defense. '76  Moreover, courts have reasoned that anyone who is
aware that he or she possesses dangerous waste material "must be
presumed to be aware of the regulation."'77
Finally, it has been argued that the term "knowingly" modifies the
phrase "without a permit."78 The terms "knowingly" and "without a
permit" are contained in the same sentence.79 However, the fact that
the phrase "without a permit" is contained in a separate subparagraph
indicates an intent by Congress that the term "knowingly" should not
travel to subparagraph (A).8" More importantly, subparagraphs (B)
and (C) of section 6928(d)(2) expressly contain the term "knowing,"
while subparagraph (A) does not.8' Such a glaring omission confirms
an intent by Congress that a defendant need not possess knowledge of
the permit status to be found guilty under section 6928(d)(2)(A).82 To
ally United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cit. 1986) (it is not a
defense under 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(1) to claim lack of knowledge'that the waste was a
hazardous waste within the meaning of the regulations). But see United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668 (3d Cir. 1984) ("As a matter of syntax we
find it no more awkward to read 'knowingly' as applying to the entire sentence than
to read it as modifying only 'treats, stores or disposes.' "), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208
(1985).
76. Dee, 912 F.2d at 745; Baytank, 934 F.2d at 612.
77. Id., citing United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Co., 402 U.S. 558,565 (1971).
78. See, e.g.; United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,113 S. Ct. 1852 (1993); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1038 (9th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 667-68.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
80. Id. However, other courts construing similar statutes have held that the mens
rea adverb adjacent to one term also modifies phrases or terms appearing at a later
point in the statute, without regard to the punctuation or grammatical structure of the
statute. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426-29 (1985) (construing statute
criminalizing food stamp fraud); United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d 442, 446-50 (D.C.
Cir.) (interpreting government "revolving door" statute), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1003
(1989).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A), (B), and (C) (1988). See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037,
which states:
The absence of the word 'knowing' in subsection (A) is in stark contrast to
its presence in the immediately following subsection (B). The statute makes
a clear distinction between non-permit holders and permit holders, requiring
in subsection (B) that the latter knowingly violate a material condition or
requirement of the permit. To read the word 'knowingly' at the beginning of
section (2) into subsection (A) would be to eviscerate this distinction. Thus,
it is plain that knowledge of the absence of a permit is not an element of the
offense' defined by subsection (A).
But see United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406 n.6 (1980) (noting that congressional
omission of mens rea does not necessarily mean that punishment can be imposed
without proof of mens rea).
82. Such interpretation is consistent with the rule of construction first enunciated
by Judge Learned Hand in SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1935),
wherein Judge Hand observed that a "'striking a change in expression' in two differ-
ent parts of the same statute indicates 'a deliberate difference of intent'." Id. Such
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construe the statute otherwise would render the term "knowingly" in
subparagraphs (B) and (C) as mere surplusage.83
Most courts considering this question have so held. s Courts have
reasoned that the statute was intended to draw a clear distinction be-
tween permit holders and non-permit holders, and that to construe the
term "knowingly" as modifying the phrase "without a permit" would
"eviscerate this distinction. ' 85 As a consequence, such courts have
held that the statutory language "is plain and the meaning is clear."'
However, one court has nonetheless refused to reach such a conclu-
sion, concluding that "[a]s a matter of syntax we find it no more awk-
ward to read 'knowingly' as applying to the entire sentence than to
read it as modifying only 'treats, stores, or disposes.' "87
When courts are faced with ambiguous criminal statutes, they often
resort to the "rule of lenity. '' 88 This rule directs courts to interpret an
"striking change" technique may be best employed when comparing two clauses in
the same sentence. LAFAVE & Scorr I, supra note 11, § 2.2(g), at 83.
Some may argue that the omission by Congress was "inadvertent." Johnson &
Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.. In Johnson & Towers, the court stated that the "[t]reatment;
storage or disposal of hazardous waste in violation of any material condition or re-
quirement of a permit must be 'knowing,' since the statute explicitly sostates in sub-
section (B)." Id. It is unlikely that Congress intended to criminally prosecute those
persons who acted without a permit irrespective of their knowledge (under subsection
(A)), but not persons who violated the terms of their permit unless that action was
knowing (subsection (B)). Thus, we are led to conclude either that the omission of
the word "knowing" in subsection (A) was inadvertent or that "knowingly" which
introduces subsection (2), applies to subsection (A). Id. See also United States v.
Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982) (construing.similar statute in which the
word "knowingly" was inserted in one subsection, but not in another; the court held,
"The different placement of the words 'knowingly' and 'knowing' in the two subsec-
tions of the statute is too Weak a reed to support the argument that Congress intended
to displace a-time-honored principle of criminal jurisprudence."), cert. denied, 460
U.S. 1081 (1983).
83. See SINGER, supra note 72.
84. See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 969 F.2d 187, 191 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[42 U.S.C.
§ 6928(d)(2)(A)] does not require that the person charged have known that a permit
was required, and that knowledge is not relevant."), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1852
(1993); Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037 (expressly holding that knowledge of lack of permit is
not an element of section 6928(d)(2)(A) offense); see also United States v. Goldsmith,
978 F.2d 643, 645-46 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (approving jury instruction that did
not require knowledge of the absence of a permit); United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d
741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) (government need not prove that defendants knew that viola-
tion of RCRA was a crime nor did they need to know of existence of specific regula-
.tions or requirements), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991). But see Johnson & Towers,
741 F.2d at 667-68 (stating in dicta that knowledge of the absence of a permit is re-
quired for conviction under section 6928(d)(2)(A)).
85. See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037.
86. Id., citing United States v. Patterson, 820 F.2d 1524, 1526 (9th Cir. 1987); the
Patterson court, in turn, based its view on statutory language from Burlington N. R.R.
Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481 U.S. 454, 461 (1987).
87: Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668.
88. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) ("ambiguity concerning
the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity"). See also
Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 427 (1985); United States v. United States
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ambiguous statute as requiring knowledge 'of the essential elements of
the crime.89 The rule of lenity ensures that individuals are given fair
warning of conduct that is deemed to be illegal.9" The rule strikes an
appropriate balance between the legislature, the prosecutor, and the
court.91 It recognizes that the power to define crimes resides with
Congress, and not with the courts.9 2 The rule of lenity is consistent
with the fundamental legal principle that conduct is not criminal un-
less committed knowingly. 93 A construction of a statute that elimi-
nates the requirement of knowledge has been generally disfavored.94
Given the ambiguity inherent in section 6928(d)(2), courts constru-
ing the statute could well have held that the term "knowingly" applies
to all elements of the crime.95  Nonetheless, the majority of such
courts have not so held.96 The reasons lie elsewhere.97
Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 437 (1978); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48
(1971); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955); United States v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)..
89. See, e.g., Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427. See also LAFAVE & Scorr I, supra note 11,
§ 2.2(d), at 78. The rule developed during the nineteenth century in England when
hundreds of crimes, many of which were minor, were punishable by death. Livingston
Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REV. 748, 750(1935). The English courts frequently went to great lengths to find any ambiguity to
prevent the imposition of a death sentence when such sentence appeared harsh. Id. at
751. Despite the-decline in the severity of punishment over the years, the rule none-
theless carried forward to this day. LAFAVE & Scorr I, supra note 11, § 2.2, at 78.
90. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 427.
91. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348 ("[Blecause of the seriousness of criminal penalties,
and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the
community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity.").
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
94. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 425; United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 438, which
states, "Certainly far more than the simple omission of the appropriate phrase from
the statutory definition is necessary to justify dispensing with an intent requirement."
Criminal offenses dispensing with a mens rea requirement have a "generally disfa-
vored status." Id. But see United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 509-10 (1955),
which states:
That criminal statutes are to be construed strictly is a proposition which calls
for the citation of no authority. But this does not mean that every criminal
statute must be given the narrowest possible meaning in complete disregard
of the purpose of the legislature.
Id. See generally LAFAVE & Scorr I, supra note 11, § 2.2(a), at 75 (discussing use of
canons in construing criminal statutes).
95. This assumes, as the author contends, that the statute is sufficiently ambiguous
so as to warrant the application of the rule of lenity. At least one court has held with
respect to the construction of the term "without a permit" that the statute is unambig-
uous, the language is plain, and the meaning is clear. If so, statutory construction of
this term is at an end. See Hoflin, 880 F.2d at 1037.
96. See supra notes 55-87 and accompanying text (discussion of how courts view
"knowingly").
97. See infra part II(A)(3).
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2. Legislative History of Section 6928(d) of RCRA
The legislative history of RCRA provides very little direct guidance
regarding the interpretation of the mens rea component of section
6928(d)(2). 9s When Congress amended RCRA in 1980, the Confer-
ence Committee stated that "[t]he state of mind for all criminal viola-
tions under [section 2629] is 'knowing.' The conferees have not
sought to define 'knowing' for offenses under subsection (d); that pro-,
cess has been left to the courts under general principles." 99
However, several amendments to section 6928 indicate congres-
sional intent to strengthen, and not weaken, the criminal provisions of
the statute.100 Moreover, in 1984, Congress made several detailed
98. See United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (lth' Cir. 1986)
("Congress did not provide any guidance, either in the statute or the legislative his-
tory, concerning the meaning of 'knowing' in section 6928(d)."); United States v.
Laughlin, 768 F. Supp..957, 961 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Congress provided little helpful
insight. . . ."); see also June F. Barrett & Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the
Knowledge Requirement of Section 6928(d) of RCRA after United States v. Dee, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV: 862, 871 (1991) ("The legislative history of RCRA gives very
little insight into the intent of Congress when it chose 'knowingly' as the scienter
requirement of section 6928(d).").
99. H.R. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5028, 5038. See, e.g., SEC v. Robert Collier & Co., 76 F.2d 939, 941 (2d
Cir. 1935), which states:
It is of course true that members [of Congress] who vote upon a bill do not
all know, probably very few of them know, what has taken place in commjt-
tee ... But courts .. recognize that while members deliberately express
their personal position upon the general purposes of the legislation, as to the
details of its articulation they accept the work of the committees; so much
they delegate because legislation could not go on in any other way.
100. In -1980, Congress increased the penalty for violation of section 6928(d)(2)(A)
from a misdemeanor to a felony. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see
also Harris et al., supra note 3, at 204 n.8 (1980 amendment significant because it
established first felony sanctions for federal environmental crime).
In 1980, Congress also made it a crime to knowingly place another person in "immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily injury." See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993). The enactment prohibited "[a]ny person who knowingly transports, treats,
stores, [or] disposes of... any. hazardous waste" from knowingly placing another
person in "imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury." Id. See Harris et al.,
supra note 3, at 207. The "knowing endangerment" offense became the first of its
kind in federal law; its enactment reflects the legislature's objective of "providing
prosecutors with enforcement authority adequate to address.the more egregious.in-
stances of improper waste disposal . . . ." Id.
In 1984, Congress made prosecutions for "knowing" endangerment under subpara-
graph (e) less difficult by repealing the requirement that a defendant must exhibit
either "an unjustified and inexcusable disregard for human life, or ... an extreme
indifference for human life" to be convicted. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e)(2)(A), (B)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
See H.R. REP. No. 198, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 55 (1983). Congress believed
that these elements had made the crime too difficult to prosecute, causing the "know-
ing endangerment" provision 'to be "unnecessarily restrictive." Id. The original stat-
ute had caused much confusion, making the statute "unduly restrictive." See S. REP.
No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5607.
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changes to the language of section 6928(d)(2), but did not add the
term "knowingly" to subparagraph (A).'' Such omission indicates a
deliberate intent by Congress to apply a strict liability standard to the
phrase "without a permit" contained in subparagraph (A).0 2
.3. Underlying Objectives of RCRA
Congress enacted RCRA as a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory scheme
for toxic substances, providing "nationwide protection against the
dangers of improper hazardous waste disposal."'0 3 RCRA provides a
"multifaceted approach toward solving the problems associated with
the 3-4 billion tons of materials generated' each year, the problems
resulted from the anticipated 8% annual increase in the volume of
such waste."'01 4 Congress determined that the placement of inade-
quate controls on hazardous waste management resulted in substan-
tial risks to human health and the environment. 0 5 Accordingly,
Congress intended to assure that hazardous waste management prac-
See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 213 ("reluctance of federal prosecutors to initiate
criminal actions" under subsection (e) for "knowing endangerment" caused repeal of
"extreme indifference" and "unjustified disregard" elements of crime).
101. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d) (as amended Nov. 8, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, Title II,
Subtitle C, §§ 232-234, Subtitle D, § 245(c), Title IV, § 403(d)(1)-(3), 98 Stat. 3256-
3258, 3264, 3272; Oct. 17, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, Title II, § 205(i), ,100 Stat. 1703)
(subsection (d)(1), inserted "or causes to be transported" and substituted "this subti-
tle" for "section 3005 (or 3006 in case of a State program)"; subsection (d)(2), in the
introductory matter, deleted "either" preceding the dash in subsection (d)(2)(A), de-
leted "having obtained" following "without," substituted "this subtitle" for "section
3005 (or 3006 in the case of a State program)," substituted subsection (d)(2)(B) for
one which read: "in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of
such permit," and added subsection (d)(2)(C)).
102. Such detailed changes, to section 6928(d) undermine the argument that the
omission of the term "knowingly" in subparagraph (A) was "inadvertent."
103. H.R. REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6238, 6249. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 3. The House Report states:
The overriding concern of the Committee however, is the effect on the popu-
lation and the environment of the disposal of discarded hazardous wastes-
those which byvirtue of their composition or longevity are harmful, toxic or
lethal. Unless neutralized or otherwise properly managed in their disposal,
hazardous wastes present a clear danger to the health and safety of the pop-
ulation and to the quality of the environment.
See also Ann K. Pollack, Note, The Role of Injunctive Relief and Settlements in
Superfund Enforcement, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 706, 709 n.24 (1983) (suggesting that
"commentators have deemed RCRA system a 'cradle-to-grave' statutory scheme be-
cause subtitle C of the Act traces hazardous waste from generator, to transporter, to
disposal facility").
104. H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 102, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6239.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(5) (1982) ("[Hlazardous waste presents, in addition to the
problems in association with non-hazardous solid wastes, special dangers to health
and requires a greater degree of regulation than does non-hazardous solid wastes.")
(language altered in 1984 amendment).
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tices are conducted in a manner that protects human health and the
environment.'16
RCRA created a system of controls whereby generators of hazard-
ous wastes must keep detailed records identifying the types and quan-
tities of wastes generated. °7 A manifest system also ensures that the
regulated waste reaches a properly permitted facility for safe dispo-
sal.10 8 Those who treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes must
comply with similar rules. 0 9 Congress considered such regulations so
106. 42 U.S.C. § 6902(4) (1982) (Congress intended to regulate the "treatment,
storage, transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes which have adverse affects
on health and the environment."') (language altered in 1984 amendment). Congress,
in RCRA itself, found that without careful planning and management of hazardous
waste, there is a great danger to human health and the environment. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The post-World War II economy produced large
quantities of hazardous waste that the public recognized as a major environmental
problem prior to the enactment of RCRA. See J. GORDON ARBUCKLE, ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW HAND3OOK 60 (12th ed. 1993). See generally ROGER W. FINDLEY &
DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (3d ed. 1991) (discussing overall public
concern regarding environmental ruin).
Congress responded to the environmental outcry with various legislation. For a
compendium of federal environmental statutes, see IA FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1994 & Supp. June 1994). See, e.g., The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (commonly referred to as The Clean Water Act of 1972), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (regulating discharge-of pollution into
waterway); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing national standards for environmental pro-
tection). The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626 (1988 &.Supp. V 1993) (regulat-
ing air pollutants). Congress also targeted the hazardous waste problem directly. See,
e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1988 & Supp.
V 1993) (regulating use and disposal of toxic materials); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (regulating cleanup of hazardous waste damage);
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (recognizing breadth of hazardous waste cleanup
problem). For a discussion of various methods of national regulation of hazardous
substances, see Charles Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Wastes, 18
ENVTL. L. 505-35 (1988).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
108. Id. § 6922(a)(5).
109. Id § 6924. See Ginamarie Alvino, Note, Landowner Liability Under CER-
CLA: Is Innocence a Defense?, 4 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 149, 151 n.11 (1988),
citing 1 Donald W. Stever, LAW OF CHEMICAL REGULATION AND HAZARDOUS
WASTE § 5.01, at 5-6 (1994), which states:.
RCRA is designed for the following purposes: 1) to provide a system for
tracking and preserving a record of hazardous waste movement from its in-
ception to disposal ("cradle to grave"); 2) to ensure disposal is accomplished
so as to prevent escape of hazardous waste into the environment; and 3) to
provide an enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance with the
regulations.
Id. See also United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 666 (3d Cir. 1984)
("Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 as a 'cradle to grave' regulatory scheme for toxic
materials.. ."). See generally William L. Rosbe, RCRA and Regulation of Hazardous
and Nonhazardous Solid Wastes-Closing the Circle of Environmental Control, 35
Bus. LAW. 1519 (1980) (providing an overview of effect of RCRA's implementation).
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serious that it enacted both civil and criminal sanctions," 0 imposing
criminal sanctions on the "most egregious of offenders.""'
Not surprisingly, almost all courts have concluded that RCRA is a
"public welfare statute.""12 The statute was designed to protect the
public health and the environment from the hazards of toxic wastes." 3
However, section 6928(d)(2) is not a "pure" public welfare'statute in
the sense that it does not impose strict liability on every element of
the crime." 4 Rather, itis a hybrid, in that it is a public welfare statute
containing a mens rea component. 15 Accordingly, one or more of the
elements require that the defendant act knowingly. 1 6 Its status as a
public welfare statute comes into play when courts are called upon to
construe ambiguous statutory terms. This occurs when the scope of
the mens rea element is in question. 1 7 In these instances, several
courts have narrowly interpreted the reach of the term "knowingly" in
section 6928(d)(2), such that the phrases "listed or identified" and
"without a permit" are held to impose strict liability." 8
110. See H.R. REP. No. 1491, supra note 2, at 30, which states, "Many times civil
penalties are more appropriate and more effective than criminal. However, many
times when there is a willful violation of a statute which seriously harms human
health, criminal penalties may be appropriate."
111. Id. H.R. REP. No. 1491 indicates that only willful violations that seriously af-
fect human health are to be penalized. See also Fike, supria note 12, at 189-90
(RCRA's criminal sanctions primarily apply to "most egregious of offenders").
Congress did not intend that criminal provisions be invoked for minor technical
violations of the statute. The tougher criminal provisions are:
intended to prevent abuses of the permit system by those who obtain and
then knowingly disregard them. It is not aimed at punishing minor or tech-
nical variations from permit regulations or conditions if the facility operator
is acting responsibility [sic]. The Department of Justice has exercised its
prosecutorial discretion responsibly under similar provisions in other stat-
utes and the conferees assume that, in light of the upgrading of the penalties
from misdemeanor to felony, similar care will be used in deciding when a
particular permit violation may warrant criminal prosecution under this Act.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1444, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 37, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5028, 5036.
'112. See United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1989) (RCRA is
public welfare statute), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990); United States v. Hayes Int'l
Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1503 (11th Cir. 1986) ("section 6928(d)(1) is undeniably a public
welfare statute, involving a heavily regulated area with great ramifications for the
public health and safety"); United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985) (concluding that RCRA can be clas-
sified as a "public welfare statute").
113. See Hayes, 786 F.2d at 1503.
114. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943) (guilt under the
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 ("FDCA"), 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-93 (1988) may be
imposed "though consciousness of wrongdoing be totally wanting").
115. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2). See, e.g." United States v. International Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971) (public welfare statute containing mens rea ele-
ment). See also J. Manly Parks, The Public Welfare Rationale: Defining Mens Rea In
RCRA, 18 WM. & MARY J. ENVTL. L. 219, 226 (1993).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2).
117. See infra parts II and III.
118. Id.
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B. Statutory Analysis of Section 9603(b) of CERCLA
Section 9603(b) of CERCLA provides:
any person-...
(3) in charge of a facility from which a hazardous substance is re-
leased, other than a federally permitted release, in a quantity equal
to or greater than that determined pursuant to Section 102 of this
title [42 U.S.C. section 9602] who fails to notify immediately the
appropriate agency of the United States Government as soon as he
has knowledge of such release or who submits in such a notification
any information which he knows to be false or misleading.., shall,
upon conviction, be fined ... or imprisoned ... or both.1 19
1. Language of Section 9603(b) of CERCLA
Section 9603(b) makes it a crime for a person in charge of a facility
to fail to notify the government of the release of a hazardous sub-
stance from the facility "as soon as he has knowledge of such re-
lease. .. . (emphasis added). At a minimum, section 9603(b)
requires that a defendant possess knowledge of the existence of a re-,
lease.121 However, the question remains as to whether section 9603(b)
requires knowledge that the substance released was hazardous.122
Moreover, some have argued that a defendant must also know that
the hazardous substance was listed or identified as such by the govern-
ment, and know that the release occurred without a permit. 123
The language of section 9603(b) provides some support for the ar-
gument that a defendant must know that the substance released was
hazardous. The word "such" in the phrase "as soon as he has knowl-
edge of such release" modifies the term "release," and refers to a re-
lease of a hazardous substance. 124 The phrase could have been
alternatively drafted: "as soon as he has knowledge of the release of
the hazardous substance."' 125 Although a literal interpretation of the
phrase might limit application of the term "knowledge" to the term
"release," a more reasonable construction also applies the term
"knowledge" to the term "hazardous substance."' 26 When presented
with a similar question under RCRA section 6928(d)(2), courts con-
119. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988 & Supp.. V 1993).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447, 1453 (11th Cir. 1988).
123. See United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
1649 (1993).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Roxanne R. Rapson & Scott
R. Brown, Mens Rea Requirements Under CERCLA: Implications For Corporate Di-
rectors, Officers And Employees, 6 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 377,
394 (1991).
125. Rapson & Brown, supra note 124, at 394.
126. See, e.g., supra part II(A)(1).
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curred that the term "knowingly" modified the term "hazardous
waste. 1
27
Furthermore, section 9603(b) of CERCLA makes it a crime for a
person in charge of a facility to submit a notice that he or she knows
contains false or misleading information. 128 Specifically, section
9603(b) applies to a person "who fails to notify immediately the ap-
propriate agency of the United States Government as soon as he has
knowledge of such release or who submits in such a notification any
information which he knows t9 be false or misleading. ". ,,129 If a
false or misleading notice is submitted, section 9603(b) unambiguously
requires knowledge that the information is false or misleading. 130
Therefore, it is logical, to assume that Congress also required knowl-
edge that the substance was hazardous when a defendant fails to no-
tify the government of such release.
There is far less support for the position that a defendant must
know that the substance was listed or identified by the government, or
that the release occurred without a permit.' 3' Section 9603(b) does
not contain such language. 32 It may be argued that such knowledge is
required under section 9603(a), 33 and that section 9603(b) should
therefore be construed in the same manner. Alternatively, a defend-
ant might argue that the statute is ambiguous, and that the rule of
lenity should therefore apply. However, the more persuasive position
is that the statute is unambiguous, and use of the rule of lenity is not
required.
2. Legislative History of Section 9603(b) of CERCLA
The legislative history of CERCLA section 9603(b) is of little assist-
ance in determining the scope of the mens rea component contained
therein.' 34 For three years, Congress considered several bills regulat-
ing the cleanup of hazardous substances, but the final billthat became
law has almost no legislative history.' 35 It was enacted hastily in the
closing days of a "lame duck" Congress.' 36
However, the congressional committees that drafted CERCLA
were the same committees that worked on the 1980 amendments to
127. Id.
128. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).
129. Id (emphasis added).
130. See id.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).
133. See id. § 9603(a).
134. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J.
ENvmT. L. 1 (1982).
135. Id
136. Id.
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RCRA.1 7 One of the initial bills dealing with the cleanup of hazard-
ous substances was first introduced as an amendment to RCRA.138 In
many ways, RCRA and'CERCLA are similar, with both addressing
the same broad concerns with a complementary regulatory and crimi-
nal enforcement scheme.' 39 Although members of Congress appeared
to be primarily concerned with the strict liability standards imposed in
the civil context, such concern should not be lost when considering the
interpretation of the criminal provisions of CERCLA.140
3. Underlying Objectives of CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA to fill gaps left by RCRA.' 4' CER-
CLA addresses the problem of existing sites contaminated by hazard-
ous substances.'42 CERCLA also attempts to avoid the consequences
of new hazardous waste spills by encouraging early notification and
adequate cleanup with governmental oversight. 43 CERCLA pro-
motes the cleanup of such sites through the creation of a "Superfund"
to finance government-sponsored cleanups, and through the authori-
zation of civil actions by private parties to recover cleanup costs from
responsible individuals. 144
Under section 9603, Congress addressed this 'problem through a no-
tification scheme.' 4 5 Section 9603(a) provides, among. other things,
137. Id. at 2.138. Id. at 35.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 2.
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k); 126 CONG. REC. 30,942 (1980) (Congress was
aware that better laws were necessary to stop the illegal disposal.and transportation of
hazardous substances, particularly by those persons called "midnight dumpers").
142. See Richard C. Belthoff, Jr., Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Section 107
of CERCLA, 11 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 141, 142 (1986) (CERCLA was designed to
address gaps in RCRA).
143. Grad, supra note 134, at 2 ("While deficient in many respects, [CERCLA],
together with the hazardous waste subtitle ("Subtitle C") of [RCRA], which was
amended and reaffirmed by the same congressional committees during the same ses-
sion of Congress, form a sufficient authorization to begin the cleanup of old hazard-
ous waste sites and to avoid the consequences of new hazardous waste spills, for the
protection of health and the environment.").
144. See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. United States Gypsum Co., 711 F. Supp.
1244, 1251 (D.N.J. 1989), which states:
The statute embodies a bifurcated scheme to promote the cleanup of hazard-
ous sites, spills and releases. First, through the creation of Superfund, the
federal government is provided with the tools to respond to the growing
problems resulting from hazardous waste disposal. Second, the statute also
authorizes private parties to institute civil actions to recover the costs in-
volved in the cleanup of hazardous wastes from those responsible for their
creation ....
Id. (citations omitted). See also Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1238
(M.D. Pa. 1990). '
145. See G. Nelson Smith, III; Waking The Sleeping Giant: The Use Of The Felony
Sanctions Under CERCLA To Ensure Compliance With Environmental Laws, 26
CREIGHTON L. REV. 449, 451-58 (1993).
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that any person in charge of a facility, "as soon as he has knowledge of
any release [other than a federally permitted release] of a hazardous
substance," in excess of a specified quantity, must immediately notify
the National Response Center of such release."4 Section 9603(b)
criminalizes the failure to provide such notification, as well as provid-
ing notification that is knowingly false or misleading.147 Congress de-
clared that "the time has come to declare war on toxic waste ... and
unleash a bold, new attack on the hazardous waste sites that threaten
the environment of our people.' ' 48
Undoubtedly, Congress was motivated by many of the same con-
cerns that prompted passage of RCRA. 49 In 1980, there was strong
public sentiment that hazardous waste posed a serious threat to public
health, and that existing laws should be strengthened to protect work-
ers and consumers.150
The reporting requirements are extremely important under CER-
CLA.' 51 Upon immediate notification of the release of a hazardous
substance, the government can act quickly to contain the spill and
minimize exposure to the public.152 Notice of the more significant re-
leases was viewed by Congress as an important first step to enabling a
prompt governmental response, particularly when those at fault for
the release had failed to do so.' 53
Therefore, it is evident that CERCLA is a public welfare statute. 54
As with RCRA, CERCLA was designed to protect the public health
and the environment from the hazards of toxic substances.155 How-
ever, as with RCRA, section 9603(b) of CERCLA is a hybrid, being a
public welfare statute containing a mens rea component. 156 Where
the reach of the mens rea component is ambiguous, courts may be
inclined to narrowly interpret such component and will impose strict
liability on ambiguous elements of the crime. By so doing, the courts
will more fully protect public health and the environment, but place
less concern on the moral blameworthiness of individual defendants.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a).
147. Id. § 9603(b).
148. 132 CONG. REC. S14,895 (1986).
149. Smith, supra note 145, at 459.
150. 123 CONG. REc. 30,940 (1980).
151. Smith, supra note 145, at 461'.
152. United States v. Cart, 880 F.2d 1550, 1552 (2d Cir. 1989).
153. 126 CONG. REC. 30,933 (1980).
154. See supra parts I, II(A)(3).
155. Id.
156. Id.
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III. TiE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
UNITED STA TES V. LAUGHLIN
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in United States v.
Laughlin,'57 recently addressed the issue of mens rea under section
6928(d)(2) of RCRA and section 9603(b) of CERCLA. Laughlin in-
volved a case of a defendant accused of the "midnight dumping" of a
highly toxic chemical. 158 On appeal, the defense and the prosecution
made numerous arguments on the scope of the mens rea elements.'
59
The Second Circuit's decision fully addressed the issues presented, af-
firming positions held by several other circuit courts, and forging new
ground on issues never before addressed. 161
A. The Facts of Laughlin
According to the prosecution, at three o'clock in the morning in late
June 1987, Harris Goldman entered onto the property of his railroad
tie treating company, GCL Tie & Treating, Inc. ("GCL"), in Sidney,
New York. 16 There, hidden by darkness, Goldman opened the valve
on a railroad tanker car containing 20,000 gallons of creosote sludge
and contaminated water, releasing the contents onto the ground. 162
The next morning, as GCL workers reported to work, they ob-
served an enormous pool of creosote sludge and water that had run
down the sides of the railroad tracks.' 63 As workers stood back from
the fumes trying to figure out what had happened, they witnessed
small field animals attempting to cross the tracks'but dying instead
upon contact with this toxic pool of chemicals. 16 The GCL site had
been purchased in 1983 by Goldman and his business partner from the
Railcon Corporation, which had also been in the business of treating
railroad ties with creosote. 65 The treatment process was designed to
render the ties impervious to natural decay due to moisture or insect
attack."6 When functioning properly, the process consisted of placing
untreated green ties into a large cylinder. Creosote was added, heated
157. 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom. Goldman v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994).
158. Id. at 963 (actually, the dumping occured at 3 a.m.).
159. Id. at 964-66 (RCRA and CERCLA addressed separately).
160. Id. at 966-67 (RCRA and CERCLA addressed separately).
161. Brief for Appellee, United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993) (No.
93-1100), at 3 (citing Supplemental Joint Appendix 91, 105 [hereinafter S.J.A.]). The
facts as described herein are quoted, with permission, from the brief of the United
States submitted to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Laughlin.
162. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 91-92).
163. Id (citing S.J.A. at 15-17, 45-46, 64).
164. Id. at 4 (citing Joint Appendix 196-208; S.J.A. 'at 64-65 (the Joint Appendix
submitted to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals [hereinafter J.A.])).
165. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 102).
166. Id (citing S.J.A. at 3).
1995]
182 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VI
to boiling temperature, and a vacuum was applied. Water and natural
wood alcohols were drawn out and the creosote penetrated the ties. 167
The water, wood alcohol, and some creosote, collectively referred
to in the industry as "boulton water," would vaporize in the cylinder
where it was then drawn off and run through condensation coils.' 68
This mixture, consisting of up to twenty-five percent creosote,6 9 was
thereafter placed in a heated evaporation tank. Once in this tank, the
creosote would quickly settle to the bottom due to its heavier weight,
forming a sludge-like consistency. Heated coils in the evaporation
tank would cause the water to boil off so that the remaining creosote
sludge could be suctioned out and placed back into storage for reuse
in treating additional ties.1 70
However, for years GCL had been having serious problems with its
treatment process. As a result, excess creosote often spilled out of the
normal "closed loop" system.17 With the knowledge of Goldman, su-
pervisors regularly directed workers to dispose of the contaminated
creosote by soaking it up with sawdust and dumping it near wetlands
located at the edge of the GCL property. 72
Because GCL had never applied for a RCRA treatment, storage, or
disposal ("TSD") permit, neither the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation ("DEC") or the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA") were aware that this site regularly
handled-and disposed of-hazardous waste. 173
After GCL reported a large but accidental creosote spill to the
DEC on October 30, 1986, inspectors began making periodic visits,
which, pursuant to the DEC's then-existing policy, were announced in
advance to ensure that the appropriate GCL managers would be
available to answer questions. 74 These pre-announced visits, how-
ever, afforded GCL management time to conduct substantial pre-in-
spection coverups of contaminated soil to prevent discovery of the
true condition of the site.' 71 Therefore, with the exception of the re-
ported October 30, 1986 spill, no regulatory agency had knowledge of
the true condition of the site until well after the time Goldman emp-
tied the railroad tanker car. 176
Throughout 1987, GCL was in poor financial condition. 77 Accord-
ingly, when the boiler developed intermittent problems due to its age
167. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 5-6).
168. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 5-6).
169. Id
170. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 5-7, 78).
171. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 67-71).
172. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 67-72).
173. Id. (citing J.A. at 187-93; SJ.A. at 1, 76, 84, 95-97).
174. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 97-98).
175. Id at 6 (citing S.J.A at 67-68, 98-101).
176. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 97).
177. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 104, 108).
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in June, it was neither repaired nor replaced. 7 8 The boiler had to
function properly, however, to heat the evaporation tank coils to
evaporate the water and recover the leftover creosote sludge. 7 9
Without the boiler working properly, GCL quickly began to run out
of storage space for the excess boulton solution.18 0 In early June 1987,
GCL employees were directed to put this mixture from the already
full evaporation tanks into a railroad taker car that had just delivered
a shipment of new creosote. 18' Thereafter, for the next several weeks
this railroad car was used to store the creosote sludge and water gen-
erated by normal plant operation. 82
During this period, Goldman became increasingly upset because
GCL was incurring a daily "demurrage" or rental charge for keeping
the railroad car beyond its normal return date. 8 3 After two weeks
had gone by with no resolution of the boiler problems, Goldman met
with GCL Vice President of Operations/Plant Manager Kenneth
Laughlin and a company consultant. The three discussed possible
courses of action.l" Laughlin outlined their most obvious short-term
options: return the railroad car with the creosote sludge and water to
Allied Chemical (the creosote manufacturer) for disposal or recycling,
or find a hazardous waste hauler to remove the tanker's contents.5
Goldman, however, had a third, far less expensive, idea: get a sprayer
truck and drive along the roads of Sidney, New York, releasing the
contents out of the back. 86 The consultant, a county legislator, be-
came very upset and told Goldman that his plan was unacceptable. 187
Laughlin told him that it was illegal. 188
After this discussion, Goldman spoke privately with Laughlin and
insisted that his plant manager dump the waste.8 9 Laughlin re-
fused.190 Confronted with the costly alternatives, Goldman decided to
do the job himself.' 9 ' Before this could happen, however, Laughlin
snuck out to the railroad car and plugged the drain hose to try toprevent the dumping 92
Unfortunately, Laughlin's efforts failed. After one aborted at-
tempt, Goldman emptied the contents in the middle of the night by
178. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 7, 49, 61).
179. Id. (citing S.J.A at 7-8).
180. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 8).
181. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 8, 62).
182. 'Id. (citing S.J.A. at 8, 11, 38, 62).
183. Id. at 7 (citing S.J.A. at 9-10, 34, 41-42, 63).
184. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 33-39).
185. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 10, 35-36).
186. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 10,. 35).
187. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 10, 36).
188. Id. (citing SJ.A. at .35).
189. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 12).
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 12, 103).
192. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 12).
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opening the car's main valve without the hose attachment. 193 . The fol-
lowing morning, Laughlin and Goldman had a heated argument over
the dumping. In front of office personnel, Goldman admitted his ac-
tion, but told Laughlin and others present that they would be fired if
the disposal was reported to the government. 194 Goldman ordered his
plant manager to arrange for the creosote sludge to be covered up.
195
Laughlin had a local contractor bring in gravel for the approximately
seventy-five by forty yard area. 196 No report was ever made to the
DEC or EPA, nor was the disposal mentioned during subsequent
inspections.197
Financial conditions at GCL continued to deteriorate, and on Au-
gust 6, 1987, Railcon exercised its rights under a note that it held from
the 1983 sale to remove Goldman from operational control and the
Board of Directors.19 GCL then filed for bankruptcy under Chapter
20011.19' Goldman, however, remained a GCL owner.Laughlin informed the president of Railcon of the June 1987 mid-
night dumping.201 In December 1987, Laughlin, at Railcon's direc-
tion, arranged for the local contractor to dig up the contaminated soil
and add it to the pile already in existence from the October 30, 1986
spill.202 Approximately 520 cubic yards were recovered.20 3
In December 1987, most of the GCL workers were laid off.20
4
Shortly thereafter, Laughlin resigned, and the facility was abandoned
except for a small crew that remained to sell off untreated ties.205 By,
May 1988, this small crew was gone as well, leaving behind a massively
contaminated site.2'. Nothing was done to dispose of or safeguard the
tens of thousands of gallons of creosote left- behind.20 7 Pipes contain-
ing creosote broke open in the winter cold and the treatment building
flooded with this substance.208 Fifty-five-gallon drums of hydrochloric
acid and other hazardous chemicals were abandoned.20 9 The facility,
located directly across the street from a shopping plaza where adoles-
cents congregated, was repeatedly vandalized. 21
193. Id. at 8 (citing S.J.A. at 13-15, 105).
194. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 19-20, 43-45).
195. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 22-23, 54).
196. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 15-16, 22, 23, 56).
197. Id. (citing J.A. at 191-93; S.J.A. 1, 97).
198. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 47).
199. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 57).
200. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 51).
201. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 27).-
202. Id. (citing J.A. at 230-33; SJ.A. at 27, 56-59).
203. Id. at 9 (citing S.J.A. at 180).
204. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 49).
205. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 49-50).
206. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 40, 48, 49, 52, 99-100).
207. Id. (citing SJ.A. at 89).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. (citing J.A. at 194; SJ.A. at 88-89).
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By the summer, the DEC learned that the facility had been de-
serted and began piecing together the details of the site's true condi-
tion. Subsequently, a criminal investigation ensued.21' After'detailed
inspections 'were conducted, the facility was declared a federal
Superfund site.212 EPA estimates for the cleanup of thecontamina-
tion were set at $4,406,336.213 The minimum cost for the cleanup of
the railroad car release was set at $607,868.14
Goldman" was indicted under 42 U.S.C. §"6928(d)(2) of RCRA and
42 U.S.C. § 9603(b) of CERCLA, and tried before a jury in the Fed-
eral District for, the Northern District of New York.215 Laughlin was
also indicted, but pled guilty before trial, and testified against
Goldman.216 After the close of evidence, the trial court charged that,
for a conviction under RCRA, the jury must find:
First, the defendant disposed of or caused others to dispose of creo-
sote sludge on or about the date set forth in the indictment; Second,
that pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the
creosote sludge was hazardous; Third, the Defendant knew creosote
sludge had a potential to be harmful to others or the environment,
or, in other words, it was not a harmless substance like uncontami-
nated water; Fourth, neither defendant nor GCL had 'obtained a
permit or interim status which authorized the disposal of hazardous
waste under the Resource Conservation And Recovery Act.217
The court charged that, for a conviction under CERCLA, the jury
must find:
(1) that there was a hazardous substance; (2) that it was in an
amount equal to or greater than the reportable quantities; (3) that it
was released from a facility; (4) that this release was other than a
federally permitted release; (5) that defendant was a person in
charge of the facility; and (6) that the defendant failed to give im-
mediate notice to the National Response- Center as soon as he had
knowledge of that release.218
Goldman's trial counsel did not preserve certain objections to the
foregoing instructions. After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict
of guilty against Goldman on both charges. Thereafter, Goldman was
sentenced to a term of incarceration of forty-two months.
211. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 88).
212. Id. (citing S.J.A. at 99).
213. Id. (citing J.A. at 310).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2.
216. Id. at 39.
217. Id. at 12 (citing J.A. at 183-84).
218. Id. at 28 (citing J.A. at 185-86).
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B. Goldman's Arguments to the Second Circuit
On appeal, Goldman argued to the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals that the instructions by the District Court on the elements of
RCRA and CERCLA were erroneous. Specifically, Goldman argued
that under RCRA, a person must know that he has disposed of a haz-
ardous waste "identified or listed" under RCRA, and know that the
disposal occurred without a permit.219 Goldman further argued that
under CERCLA, a person must know that the hazardous substance
released was listed or identified under CERCLA, and know that the
release occurred without a permit.22 °
Alternatively, Goldman-also argued to the Second Circuit that the
District Court had erred when it charged the jury that Goldman need
only know that "creosote sludge had a potential to be harmful to the
environment and others, or, in other words, it is not a harmless sub-
stance like uncontaminated water. ' 221 Among other things, Goldman
contended that the District Court's instructions showed variances
from the statutory meaning of "hazardous waste" under RCRA.22
Goldman also argued that under section 9603(b) of CERCLA, the
District Court should have instructed that the defendant must know
that the chemical was a hazardous substance defined as such under
CERCLA. Although the foregoing issues were not preserved in the
District Court, Goldman's appellate counsel requested that the Sec-
ond Circuit address the issues because they involved "plain error."
Goldman contended that the language of the statute supported his
construction of the mens rea elements of the crime.223 Goldman
maintained that in section 6928(d)(2), Congress explicitly used the
term "hazardous waste identified or listed under this sub-chapter" and
that, as a defined term under RCRA, hazardous waste has a specific
meaning under the statute.224 Goldman stated that Congress did not
intend that the term "hazardous waste" be interpreted in accordance
with common usage.225 Rather, Congress expressly required construc-
tion by reference to the statutory definition.2 6 Goldman reasoned
that to interpret section 6928(d)(2) otherwise would be to render the
words "identified or listed under this subchapter" meaningless, or as
mere surplusage."2 7
219. Brief of Defendant-Appellant Harris Goldman at 20, United States v. Laugh-
lin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1100), cert. denied sub nom. United States v.
Goldman, 114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
220. Id
221. Id. at 34.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 22-26.
224. Id. at 24.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 24-25.
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Goldman further argued that a practical reason existed for the re-
quirement that a person know that the substance is "identified or.
listed" as a hazardous waste under RCRA.22 As indicated in the trial
testimony of the prosecution's expert on the identification of hazard-
ous wastes and substances,229 only highly trained individuals with the
government have the ability to identify substances as hazardous
wastes under 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).230 Goldman maintained that Con-
gress'intended that a person merely know that a substance is "identi-
fied or listed" by the EPA as a hazardous Waste, rather than require
the person to go through the complex process of attempting to deter
mine whether a particular substance fits the detailed statutory defini-
tion of "hazardous waste" or "hazardous substance."23'
In addition, Goldman argued, on the basis of the decisions in John-
son & Towers, Inc. and United States v. Hayes International Corp., that
knowledge of the permit status was required.232 The fact that Con-
gress had omitted the word "knowingly" from subparagraph (A) was,
from Goldman's viewpoint, "too weak a reed to support the argument
that Congress intended to displace a time honored rule of criminal'
jurisprudence" that conduct must be committed knowingly to 'be
criminal.233
Moreover, Goldman maintained that the government's interpreta-
tion of the statute would criminalize a broad range of innocent con-
duct.234 Goldman contended that the "normal purpose of the criminal
law is to condemn and punish conduct that society regards as im-
moral. ' 235 Goldman stated that Congress must clearly demonstrate its
wish that morally innocent conduct be condemned before such con-
struction will be given.236
Goldman further argued that, to the extent that the statute was am-
biguous, the Second Circuit should follow the rule of lenity and inter-
pret the statute in favor of a defendant.237 Moreover, Goldman
maintained that such construction would provide individuals with ade-
quate notice of the conduct declared to be criminal, thereby affording
adequate notice and due'process under the Constitution.238
228. Id. at 25.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 25-26 (citing Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (criminal liabil-
ity predicated on knowing violation of tax laws, due to complexity of such laws)).
232. Id. at 25-26 (citing United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662, 668
(3d Cir. 1984); United States v. Hayes Int'l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).
233. Id at 29-31. See United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir. 1982).
234. Appellant's Brief at 29-31. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985);
United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1982).
235. Appellant's Brief at 30.
236. Id
237. Id at 31-32. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); Rewis v.
United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971).
238. Appellant's Brief at 32.
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Tlirning to section 9603(b) of CERCLA, Goldman argued that sec-
tion 9603(b) requires, as elements of the crime charged, that the per-
son know that the substance has been listed by the government as
hazardous, and know that the release occurred without a permit.239
Goldman contended that the language of the statute supported such
interpretation, in that section 9603(b) requires notice "as soon as he
has knowledge of such release."240 Goldman reasoned that the term
"such release" pertains to the release of a hazardous substance as de-
fined by CERCLA.24 Goldman postulated that, Congress intended
that the person know that the substance is one which has been listed
as hazardous by the government under CERCLA, and that a permit
existed, before criminal liability may be imposed.242
Goldman further argued that such interpretation of section 9603(b)
is consistent with the general rule that criminal statutes, require inten-
tional conduct as a precondition to liability.24 3 Likewise, such con-
struction avoids an interpretation of section' 9603(b) that would
criminalize a broad range of innocent conduct.2 " Finally, Goldman
contended that, at the very least, section 9603(b) is ambiguous.245 As
a consequence, ambiguities must be resolved in favor of lenity.246
C. The Government's Arguments to the Second Circuit
In response, the government argued that a plain reading of section
6928(d)(2)(A) should lead to the conclusion that the term "know-
ingly" does not modify the phrase "without a permit," in that subsec-
tions (B) and (C) of section 6928(d)(2) specifically include the
modifier "knowingly" and that subsection (A) does not include such
modifier.247 The government contended that subsections (B) and (C)
are different from subsection (A), because they involve technical reg-
ulatory violations.248 In contrast, subsection (A) applies to a much
broader class of conduct more likely to be subject to governmental
regulation.249 The government further argued that violation of
RCRA, a public welfare statute, is a general intent crime.25 0 The gov-
ernment maintained that such construction is consistent with prior
court interpretations of similar statutes.25 ' The government noted
239. Id. at 32-34.
240. Id. at 33.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 34.,
246. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
247. Brief for Appellee, United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961 (2d Cir. 1993) (No.
93-1100), at 13-14 [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
248. Id. at 14.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 15-19.
251. Id. at 19.
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that a majority of the circuit courts that have considered this issue
have held that knowledge of the permit status is not required.252 The
government also urged the Second Circuit to reject the analysis of the
Third Circuit in Johnson & Towers.253
In response to Goldman's argument that the District Court had
erred when it did-not instruct the jury that Goldman must know that
the waste was "listed or identified" as hazardous, the government ar-
gued that a mistake or ignorance of the law is no defense.254 The gov-
ernment reasoned that if such were allowed, the government would
find it extremely difficult to protect the public against criminal
activities. 5
In response to Goldman's arguments that the jury should have been
instructed that Goldman must know that the waste was listed as a haz-
ardous substance Under CERCLA, or know that the release occurred
without a permit, the government likewise argued that CERCLA is a
general intent, public welfare statute, and' that therefore the govern-
ment need not prove that the defendant specifically intended to vio-
late the statute.256 The government reasoned that CERCLA was
designed to ensure the government's ability to rapidly respond to an
illegal hazardous release. 57 The government adopted much of
its argument and reasoning under RCRA and applied them to
CERCLA.25a
D. The Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit held that under section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA, a
person need not know that he or she disposed of a hazardous waste
"identified or listed" under RCRA.259 The court indicated that when
knowledge is an element of a statute regulating hazardous substances,
"the knowledge element is satisfied upon a showing that a defendant
was aware that he or she was performing the prescribed acts; knowl-
edge of regulatory requirements is not necessary. '260 The court rea-
soned that given the "presumption of awareness of regulation" stated
by the Supreme Court in United. States v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp., section 6928(d)(2)(A) should only require that a de-
252. Id at 20-23.
253. Id at 23.
254. Id at 24-27.
255. Id. at 26.
256. Id. at 27-30.
257. Id at 27-28.
258. Id at 27.
259. United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 965 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Goldman v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994).
260. Id
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fendant have a "general awareness" that he [or she] is engaging in the
acts prescribed by the statute.26'
The Second Circuit also determined that under RCRA section
6928(d)(2)(A), a person need not know that the disposal occurred
without a permit.262 The court rec6gnized that most other circuit
courts addressing this issue are in accord.263 The Second Circuit
stated that its ruling was not only supported by the "presumption of
awareness of regulation," but also by the fact that the word "know-
ingly" is included in subsections (B) and (C) of section 6928(d)(2)
"but notably omitted from paragraph (A) .... "2 The court reiter-
ated that the government need only prove that a defendant "was
aware of [his or her] act of disposing of a substance he [or she] knew
was hazardous.
265
The Second Circuit likewise held that a person need not know that
the substance released violated CERCLA.266 Its reasoning under
RCRA applied "with equal force" to CERCLA.267 The court de-
clared that CERCLA is a public welfare statute having "a regulatory
scheme intended to protect the public health and safety. '268 The
court noted that the reporting requirement under CERCLA is very
important to ensure that the government may "move quickly to check
the spread of a hazardous release. 269 As a consequence, section
9603(a) does not require knowledge of CERCLA regulations pertain-
ing to the substance.270 Rather, section 9603(a) "demands only that
the defendant be aware of his [or her] acts."271 However, the court's
decision leaves it unclear whether a defendant must know that a sub-
stance released was hazardous.272 The court also did not address
Goldman's argument thatCERCLA required knowledge that the re-
lease occurred without a permit, although it may be presumed that the
court rejected that argument.273
Importantly, the Second Circuit agreed With Goldman that a jury
should be instructed that, under RCRA, a defendant must know that
the substance "posed a substantial present or potential hazard. '2 74
The Second Circuit reasoned that RCRA defined "hazardous waste"
261. ld United States v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558
(1971).
262. Laughlin 10 F.3d at 966.
263. Id.
264. Id
265. Id
266. Id at 966-67.
267. Id at 966.
268. Id
269. Id
270. Id at 966-67.
271. Id at 967.
272. See id. at 966-67.
273. See Appellant's Brief at 32-34.
274. Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 967.
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as any "solid waste.., which... may... pose a substantial present or
potential hazard to human health or the environment when improp-
erly .. . disposed of."'2 75 The Second Circuit stated that the word.
"substantial" should be included in jury instructions relating to knowl-
edge of hazardous waste under RCRA.276 The court indicated
Section 6903(5) clearly provides that before waste will be deemed
"hazardous" within the meaning of RCRA, it must present not sim-
ply a potential hazard, but a substantial potential hazard. The jury
277should have the benefit of the statutory definition.
However, the Second Circuit refused to reverse Goldman's conviction
because the failure to give such instruction was not plain error.278 The
court also did not address whether the District Court should have in-
structed that a defendant must know that the substance released was
hazardous "as defined by CERCLA. ' 27 9
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN
UNITED STATES V. LAUGHLIN
The Second Circuit's decision in Laughlin represents a compromise
in the battle between the mens rea and public welfare principles as
applied to RCRA section 6928(d)(2)(A) and CERCLA section
9603(b).281 The decision fulfills the objectives of RCRA and CER-
CLA to protect the public health and environmeit,281 but preserves
an element of fairness. to a criminal defendant by requiring that he
generally know that what he or she is doing is wrong.
Under section. 6928(d)(2)(A) of RCRA, the Second Circuit reaf-
firmed the position of a majority of circuit courts that the term "know-
ingly" does not modify the phrases "listed or identified" or "without a
permit. ' 28 3 The decision puts another nail in the coffin of the Third
Circuit's decision in Johnson & Towers,28 which has now been so se-
verely eroded as to stand isolated in the scheme of judicial prece-
dent.285 The Second Circuit also provided strong support for the
position that the term "knowingly" modifies the term "hazardous
waste," virtually ending the debate on how far down the sentence the
term "knowingly" travels 86
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. See id.; Appellant's Brief at 33.
280. See supra part I.
281. See.supra parts II(A)(3) and II(B)(3).
282. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
283. Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 964-67.
284. United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
285. See Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 966; Appellee's Brief at 23. -
286. See Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 967.
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The government's ability to prove such environmental crimes is not
particularly difficult under the standard set by the Second Circuit.287
Whether a person knows that a substance is "listed or identified," or
that a permit existed, are not readily provable, because they are facts
primarily within the province of the person's mind.2 8 However, the
fact that a personknows, in general, that a substance is hazardous is
easily provable through ordinarily extensive direct or circumstantial
evidence.289
Most importantly, the Second Circuit's decision charts a course to-
ward a somewhat more stringent instruction than has been previously
used when describing the mens rea element of section 6928(d)(2)(A)
of RCRA.29 ° In the past, many courts have instructed that a defend-
ant must know that the waste "had the potential to be harmful to
others or to the environment, or, in other words, it was not a harmless
substance like water.... .291 Such an instruction could give a jury the
impression that only trivial or slight harms would qualify.292 The Sec-
ond Circuit recognized that a more appropriate instruction should in-
clude the Word "substantial," in that such an instruction would
correspond to the statutory definition of "hazardous waste" in
RCRA.293
The Second Circuit implicitly recognized that such an instruction
had been improperly adopted from an opinion of the Supreme Court
that construed a different environmental statute.294 In International
Minerals, the Supreme Court had construed the term "knowingly" as
used in a statute regulating, among other things, corrosive liquids.295
Section 843(f) of Title 18 of the United States Code stated that who-
287. See Appellee's Brief at 26; Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 123 (1974)
(when construing 18 U.S.C. § 1461'involving the use of the mails for mailing anything
unmailable, the Supreme Court stated, "To require proofof a defendant's knowledge
of the legal status of the materials would permit the defendant to avoid prosecution
by simply claiming that he had not brushed up on the law.").
288. See 1 E. DEVIrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUC-
TIONS § 17.07 ("The intent of a person or the knowledge that a person possesses at
any given time may not ordinarily be proved directly because there is no way of di-
rectly scrutinizing the workings of the human mind . .
289. See Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 962-64.
290. Id. at 967.
291. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
292. At oral argument in Laughlin, Chief Judge Newman questioned the govern-
ment whether the omission of the term "substantial" from a jury instruction on the
mens rea element of 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2) would permit conviction for slight or
trivial harms.
293. Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 967.
294. The Second Circuit cited United States v. International Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971), on five separate.instances, stating that its conclusion was
supported by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in that case. See Laughlin, 10 F.3d
at 965-67. At oral argument, appellant's counsel argued that the instruction on the
mens rea element had been adapted from International Minerals, but that the RCRA
definition should control. The Second Circuit agreed. Id. at 967.
295. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559.
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ever "knowingly violates" any Interstate, Commerce Regulation re-
lated to the safe transportation of "explosives or other dangerous
articles," including "corrosive liquids," is guilty of a crime. 2 9 6 In Inter-
national Minerals, the defendant was charged with the unlawful ship-
ment of sulfuric acid.297 Section 831 of Title 18 of the United States
Code defined various terms in the statute, but did not define the terms
"dangerous articles" or "corrosive liquid. ' 298 , The Supreme Court
held, among other things, that the term "knowingly" required only
that a defendant be aware that he was shipping sulfuric acid, rather
than an innocuous substance, such as distilled water.2 99
When circuit courts subsequently construed the necessary elements
of the crime stated in 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2), they "borrowed" the
language of the Supreme Court expressed in International Minerals.300
The circuit courts held that a defendant must only know that the sub-
stance posed a "potential to be harmful to others or to the environ-
ment, or, in other words, it was not an innocuous substance like/
water."' 30 1 The courts apparently did. not give consideration to the fact
that the statute construed by the Supreme Court in International Min-
erals was dissimilar to section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA. 3°2 Title 18 of the
United States Code, section 831, did not define the terms "dangerous
articles" or "corrosive liquids, ' 3° 3 whereas 42 U.S.C. § 6903 defined
the term "hazardous waste." 3" Section 6903(5) of RCRA defines
"hazardous waste" as a substance posing a "substantial" potential or
present hazard to human health or the environment.0 5 In further
296. In International Minerals, the defendant was charged with unlawful transporta-
tion of sulfuric acid and hydrofluorosilicic acid in interstate commerce, and knowing
failure to show on the shipping papers the required classification as a corrosive liquid.
18 U.S.C. § 834(a) authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission to promulgate
regulations for the safe transportation of corrosive liquids. 18 U.S.C. § 834(f) stated
that whoever "knowingly violates any such regulation" has committed *a crime. 49
C.F.R. § 173.427 was thereafter promulgated, which stated, "Each shipper offering for
transportation any.hazardous material subject to the regulations in this chapter, shall
describe that article on the shipping paper by the shipping name ... ." Id.
297. International Minerals, 402 U.S. at'559.
298. See 18 U.S.C. § 831.
299. Specifically, the Supreme Court stated:
So far as possession, say, of sulfuric acid is concerned the requirement of
"mens rea" has been made a requirement of the Act as evidenced by the use
of the word "knowingly." A person thinking in good faith that he was ship-
ping distilled water when in fact he was shipping some dangerous acid would
not be covered.
International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 563-64.
300. Id.
301. United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 965 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Goldman v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994).
302. Compare 18 U.S.C. 834(f) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) with 42 U.S.C. § 6903 (1988
& Supp. V 1993).
303. See 18 U.S.C. § 831 (1988).
304. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
305. Id.
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contrast, the terms "dangerous articles" and "corrosive liquids," as
used in 18 U.S.C. § 831, are not the same as, or necessarily analogous
to, the term "hazardous waste" as used in section 6928(d)(2)(A) of
RCRA.3°6 Such instruction may impose a greater burden on the pros-
ecution, in that it must deal with the issue of whether the defendant
knew that the waste had a "substantial" potential for harm.30 7 From a
defense perspective, such wording opens the door for arguments on
the degree to which a defendant knew that the harm might be sub-
stantial.3 °8 Whether to focus upon such a standard may depend upon
whether the waste is generally known to be very harmful, or whether
the waste has more subtle harmful properties not ordinarily within
public knowledge. 309
Some defendants may argue that the Second Circuit's decision re-
quires that a verbatim instruction be given on the statutory definition
of "hazardous waste," together with any ancillary definitions con-
tained therein that are necessary to such instruction.310 The purpose
of such a tactic would be to confuse the jury with complex statutory
language, giving the impression that only individuals with highly spe-
cialized training could determine whether a waste is hazardous.31' On
the other hand, the prosecution might focus upon the word "may," as
contained in the statutory definition, arguing that anything "may"
pose a substantial risk of harm to human health or the environment. 312 .
These arguments miss the essence of what the Second Circuit said in
Laughlin.31 3 The court described the mens rea element of RCRA in
simple language, ordinarily understandable to the average juror.31 4
The court's decision is in accord with the common understanding of
306. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 831 with 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5).
307. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988). See, e.g., United States v. Meek, 998 F.2d 776,
780 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gould, 983 F.2d 92, 94 (7th Cir. 1993); Tennyson
v. Brower, 823 F. Supp. 421, 423 (E.D. Ky.'1993).
308. See id.
309. This proposition assumes that a jury may be more inclined to find that a waste
poses a substantial harm when the community at large generally knows that such
waste has such properties. For example, the community generally knows that asbestos
or radioactive waste would pose a substantial harm. See, e.g., 1 DEViTr & BLACK-
MAR, supra note 281, § 8.01.
310. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5), which defines the term "hazardous waste," contains
within its definition certain terms that are further defined under separate subsections.
For example, a "hazardous waste" is defined as a "solid waste" having certain charac-
teristics. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) defines the term "solid waste."
311. See DEVrrr & BLACKMAR, supra note 281, § 8.01 (treatise admonishes judges
'to provide juries with clear and understandable instructions on the law); Jack B.
Weinstein, The Power and Duty of Federal Judges to Marshall and Comment on the
Evidence in Jury Trials and Some Suggestions on Charging Juries, 118 F.R.D. 161, 168
(1988).
312. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
313. See United States v. Laughlin, 10 F'3d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Goldman v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1649 (1994).
314. Id.
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what is a hazardous waste. 3" A waste is hazardous when, if improp-
erly handled, it poses a serious risk of harm to health or the environ-
ment.316 Something having a "slight" or "trivial" impact is not
commonly included within the scope of that which is considered to be
a hazardous waste.317 Therefore, it would be improper for a trial
court to use the phrase "or, in other words, it is not a harmless sub-
stance like distilled water. ' 318 A hazardous waste under RCRA is
more than a trivial harm.31 9
The court's decision on the mens rea elements of section 9603(b) of
CERCLA demonstrates an intent, when possible, to interpret CER-
CLA in a consistent manner with RCRA.32 ° The Second Circuit ex-
pressly stated that its analysis under RCRA applied "with equal
force" to CERCLA.32' The court recognized that both statutes are, in
general, aimed to remedy the same harms.322 As with RCRA, the
Second Circuit refused to broadly interpret section 9603(b) of CER-
CLA, such that a defendant must have knowledge of CERCLA regu-
lations to be found guilty of such offense.323
However, the court's decision, leaves unanswered certain important
questions.324 Must a defendant merely know that a release occurred,
or also that the substance released was hazardous? 325 If a defendant
must know that the substance released was hazardous, must the trial
court instruct the jury in accordance with the statutory definition of
"hazardous substance" under CERCLA? 326 Based upon the forego-
ing analysis of RCRA and CERCLA, a strong argument can be made
that a defendant must know that the substance released was hazard-
ous, and that the instruction on the term "hazardous substance"
should be in accordance with the statutory definition.327
315. Compare supra note 259 (person need not know substance violated RCRA)
with note 274 (under RCRA, jury must be instructed that defendant knew substance
"posed a substantial present or potential hazard) and notes 266-267 (reasoning ap-
plied "with equal force to CERCLA").
316. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(B) (1988) (defining hazardous waste).
317. See id.
318. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (discussion of jury instructions).
319. See United States v. Laughlin, 10 F.3d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub
nom. Goldman v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1649).
320. See id. at 966.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 966-67.
324. Appellant's Brief did not request the Second Circuit to address certain ques-
tions, and the court chose not to explicitly address others.
325. Laughlin, 10 F.3d at 966-67.
326. Id.
327. Such argument is consistent with the manner in which the majority of courts
have answered analog6us questions under section 6928(d)(2) of RCRA.
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CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit's decision provides strong guidance for future
cases involving the interpretation of section 6928(d)(2)(A) of RCRA
and section 9603(b) of CERCLA. The decision achieves a balance
between the need to protect the public from serious environmental
harms and the desire to treat criminal defendants with an appropriate
measure of fairness and justice. The Second Circuit accomplished
such a result in a manner that is consistent with the language of the
statute, the legislative history, and the underlying purposes of RCRA
and CERCLA.
